
Chapter 15: Security - Objectives

- ▶ To discuss security threats and attacks
- ▶ To explain the fundamentals of encryption, authentication, and hashing
- ▶ To examine the uses of cryptography in computing
- To describe the various countermeasures to security attacks



The Security Problem

- Security must consider external environment of the system, and protect the system resources
- Intruders (crackers) attempt to breach security
- Threat is potential security violation
- Attack is attempt to breach security
- Attack can be accidental or malicious
- Easier to protect against accidental than malicious misuse






Security Violations

- Categories
 - Breach of confidentiality Unauthorized access
 - Breach of integrity Unauthorized data modification
 - Breach of availability Unavailable data
 - Theft of service
 - Denial of service
- Methods
 - Masquerading (breach authentication)
 - Replay attack
 - Message modification
 - Man-in-the-middle attack
 - Session hijacking



Standard Security Attacks





Security Measure Levels

- Security must occur at four levels to be effective:
 - Physical
 - Human
 - Avoid social engineering, phishing, dumpster diving
 - Operating System
 - Network
- Security is as weak as the weakest chain



Program Threats

- Trojan Horse
 - Code segment that misuses its environment
 - Exploits mechanisms for allowing programs written by users to be executed by other users
 - Spyware, pop-up browser windows, covert channels
- Trap Door
 - Specific user identifier or password that circumvents normal security procedures
 - Could be included in a compiler
- Logic Bomb
 - Program that initiates a security incident under certain circumstances
- Stack and Buffer Overflow
 - Exploits a bug in a program (overflow either the stack or memory buffers)




C Program with Buffer-overflow Condition

```
#include <stdio.h>
#define BUFFER SIZE 256
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 char buffer[BUFFER SIZE];
 if (argc < 2)
     return -1;
 else {
     strcpy(buffer, argv[1]);
     return 0;
```



Layout of Typical Stack Frame






Modified Shell Code

```
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
  execvp("/bin/sh","/bin/sh", NULL);
  return 0;
}
```



Hypothetical Stack Frame



Before attack

After attack

Program Threats (Cont.)

Viruses

- Code fragment embedded in legitimate program
- Very specific to CPU architecture, operating system, applications
- Usually borne via email or as a macro
 - Visual Basic Macro to reformat hard drive

```
Sub AutoOpen()
Dim oFS
   Set oFS =
   CreateObject(''Scripting.FileSystemObject'')
   vs = Shell(''c:command.com /k format
   c:'',vbHide)
End Sub
```




Program Threats (Cont.)

- Virus dropper inserts virus onto the system
- Many categories of viruses, literally many thousands of viruses
 - File
 - Boot
 - Macro
 - Source code
 - Polymorphic
 - Encrypted
 - Stealth
 - Tunneling
 - Multipartite
 - Armored



A Boot-sector Computer Virus





System and Network Threats

- Worms use spawn mechanism; standalone program
- Internet worm
 - Exploited UNIX networking features (remote access) and bugs in *finger* and *sendmail* programs
 - Grappling hook program uploaded main worm program
- Port scanning
 - Automated attempt to connect to a range of ports on one or a range of IP addresses
- Denial of Service
 - Overload the targeted computer preventing it from doing any useful work
 - Distributed denial-of-service (**DDOS**) come from multiple sites at once




Cryptography as a Security Tool

- Broadest security tool available
 - Source and destination of messages cannot be trusted without cryptography
 - Means to constrain potential senders (sources) and / or receivers (destinations) of messages
- Based on secrets (keys)



Secure Communication over Insecure Medium





Encryption

- Encryption algorithm consists of
 - Set of K keys
 - Set of M Messages
 - Set of C ciphertexts (encrypted messages)
 - A function $E: K \to (M \to C)$. That is, for each $k \in K$, E(k) is a function for generating ciphertexts from messages.
 - Both E and E(k) for any k should be efficiently computable functions.
 - A function $D: K \to (C \to M)$. That is, for each $k \in K$, D(k) is a function for generating messages from ciphertexts.
 - Both D and D(k) for any k should be efficiently computable functions.
- An encryption algorithm must provide this essential property: Given a ciphertext $c \in C$, a computer can compute m such that E(k)(m) = c only if it possesses D(k).
 - Thus, a computer holding D(k) can decrypt ciphertexts to the plaintexts used to produce them, but a computer not holding D(k) cannot decrypt ciphertexts.
 - Since ciphertexts are generally exposed (for example, sent on the network), it is important that it be infeasible to derive D(k) from the ciphertexts



Symmetric Encryption

- Same key used to encrypt and decrypt
 - \blacksquare E(k) can be derived from D(k), and vice versa
- DES is most commonly used symmetric blockencryption algorithm (created by US Govt)
 - Encrypts a block of data at a time
- Triple-DES considered more secure
- Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), twofish up and coming
- RC4 is most common symmetric stream cipher, but known to have vulnerabilities
 - Encrypts/decrypts a stream of bytes (i.e wireless transmission)
 - Key is a input to psuedo-random-bit generator
 - Generates an infinite keystream



Asymmetric Encryption

- Public-key encryption based on each user having two keys:
 - public key published key used to encrypt data
 - private key key known only to individual user used to decrypt data
- Must be an encryption scheme that can be made public without making it easy to figure out the decryption scheme
 - Most common is RSA block cipher
 - Efficient algorithm for testing whether or not a number is prime
 - No efficient algorithm is know for finding the prime factors of a number




Asymmetric Encryption (Cont.)

- Formally, it is computationally infeasible to derive $D(k_d, N)$ from $E(k_e, N)$, and so $E(k_e, N)$ need not be kept secret and can be widely disseminated
 - $\blacksquare E(k_e, N)$ (or just k_e) is the **public key**
 - $\blacksquare D(k_d, N)$ (or just k_d) is the **private key**
 - *N* is the product of two large, randomly chosen prime numbers *p* and *q* (for example, *p* and *q* are 512 bits each)
 - Encryption algorithm is $E(k_e, N)(m) = m^{k_e} \mod N$, where k_e satisfies $k_e k_d \mod (p-1)(q-1) = 1$
 - The decryption algorithm is then $D(k_d, N)(c) = c^{k_d} \mod N$



Encryption and Decryption using RSA Asymmetric Cryptography





Cryptography (Cont.)

- Note symmetric cryptography based on transformations, asymmetric based on mathematical functions
 - Asymmetric much more compute intensive
 - Typically not used for bulk data encryption



Authentication

- Constraining set of potential senders of a message
 - Complementary and sometimes redundant to encryption
 - Also can prove message unmodified
- Algorithm components
 - A set *K* of keys
 - A set *M* of messages
 - A set A of authenticators
 - \blacksquare A function $S: K \to (M \to A)$
 - That is, for each $k \in K$, S(k) is a function for generating authenticators from messages
 - Both S and S(k) for any k should be efficiently computable functions
 - A function $V: K \to (M \times A \to \{\text{true, false}\})$. That is, for each $k \in K$, V(k) is a function for verifying authenticators on messages
 - Both V and V(k) for any k should be efficiently computable functions



Authentication (Cont.)

- For a message m, a computer can generate an authenticator $a \in A$ such that V(k)(m, a) = true only if it possesses S(k)
- Thus, computer holding S(k) can generate authenticators on messages so that any other computer possessing V(k) can verify them
- Computer not holding S(k) cannot generate authenticators on messages that can be verified using V(k)
- Since authenticators are generally exposed (for example, they are sent on the network with the messages themselves), it must not be feasible to derive *S*(*k*) from the authenticators



Authentication – Hash Functions

- Basis of authentication
- Creates small, fixed-size block of data (message digest, hash value) from m
- ▶ Hash Function *H* must be collision resistant on *m*
 - Must be infeasible to find an $m' \neq m$ such that H(m) = H(m')
- ▶ If H(m) = H(m'), then m = m'
 - The message has not been modified
- ➤ Common message-digest functions include MD5, which produces a 128-bit hash, and SHA-1, which outputs a 160-bit hash



Authentication - MAC

- Symmetric encryption used in messageauthentication code (MAC) authentication algorithm
- Simple example:
 - MAC defines S(k)(m) = f(k, H(m))
 - Where *f* is a function that is one-way on its first argument
 - k cannot be derived from f(k, H(m))
 - Because of the collision resistance in the hash function, reasonably assured no other message could create the same MAC
 - A suitable verification algorithm is $V(k)(m, a) \equiv (f(k,m) = a)$
 - Note that k is needed to compute both S(k) and V(k), so anyone able to compute one can compute the other



Authentication – Digital Signature

- Based on asymmetric keys and digital signature algorithm
- Authenticators produced are digital signatures
- In a digital-signature algorithm, computationally infeasible to derive $S(k_s)$ from $V(k_v)$
 - V is a one-way function
 - Thus, k_v is the public key and k_s is the private key
- Consider the RSA digital-signature algorithm
 - Similar to the RSA encryption algorithm, but the key use is reversed
 - Digital signature of message $S(k_s)(m) = H(m)^{k_s} \mod N$
 - The key k_s again is a pair d, N, where N is the product of two large, randomly chosen prime numbers p and q
 - Verification algorithm is $V(k_v)(m, a) \equiv (a^{k_v} \mod N = H(m))$
 - Where k_v satisfies $k_v k_s \mod (p-1)(q-1) = 1$



Authentication (Cont.)

- Why authentication if a subset of encryption?
 - Fewer computations (except for RSA digital signatures)
 - Authenticator usually shorter than message
 - Sometimes want authentication but not confidentiality
 - Signed patches et al
 - Can be basis for non-repudiation




Key Distribution

- Delivery of symmetric key is huge challenge
 - Sometimes done out-of-band
- Asymmetric keys can proliferate stored on key ring
 - Even asymmetric key distribution needs care man-inthe-middle attack



Man-in-the-middle Attack on Asymmetric Cryptography





Digital Certificates

- Proof of who or what owns a public key
- Public key digitally signed a trusted party
- Trusted party receives proof of identification from entity and certifies that public key belongs to entity
- Certificate authority are trusted party their public keys included with web browser distributions
 - They vouch for other authorities via digitally signing their keys, and so on




Encryption Example - SSL

- Insertion of cryptography at one layer of the ISO network model (the transport layer)
- SSL Secure Socket Layer (also called TLS)
- Cryptographic protocol that limits two computers to only exchange messages with each other
 - Very complicated, with many variations
- Used between web servers and browsers for secure communication (credit card numbers)
- ▶ The server is verified with a certificate assuring client is talking to correct server
- Asymmetric cryptography used to establish a secure session key (symmetric encryption) for bulk of communication during session
- Communication between each computer theb uses symmetric key cryptography



User Authentication

- Crucial to identify user correctly, as protection systems depend on user ID
- User identity most often established through passwords, can be considered a special case of either keys or capabilities
 - Also can include something user has and /or a user attribute
- Passwords must be kept secret
 - Frequent change of passwords
 - Use of "non-guessable" passwords
 - Log all invalid access attempts





Implementing Security Defenses

- Defense in depth is most common security theory
 multiple layers of security
- Security policy describes what is being secured
- Vulnerability assessment compares real state of system / network compared to security policy
- Intrusion detection endeavors to detect attempted or successful intrusions
 - Signature-based detection spots known bad patterns
 - Anomaly detection spots differences from normal behavior
 - Can detect zero-day attacks
 - False-positives and false-negatives a problem
- Virus protection
- Auditing, accounting, and logging of all or specific system or network activities




Firewalling to Protect Systems and Networks

- A network firewall is placed between trusted and untrusted hosts
 - The firewall limits network access between these two security domains
- Can be tunneled or spoofed
 - Tunneling allows disallowed protocol to travel within allowed protocol (i.e. telnet inside of HTTP)
 - Firewall rules typically based on host name or IP address which can be spoofed
- Personal firewall is software layer on given host
 - Can monitor / limit traffic to and from the host
- Application proxy firewall understands application protocol and can control them (i.e. SMTP)
- System-call firewall monitors all important system calls and apply rules to them (i.e. this program can execute that system call)



Network Security Through Domain Separation Via Firewall





Computer Security Classifications

- ▶ U.S. Department of Defense outlines four divisions of computer security: A, B, C, and D.
- ▶ D Minimal security.
- ▶ C Provides discretionary protection through auditing. Divided into C1 and C2. C1 identifies cooperating users with the same level of protection. C2 allows user-level access control.
- ▶ B All the properties of C, however each object may have unique sensitivity labels. Divided into B1, B2, and B3.
- ▶ A Uses formal design and verification techniques to ensure security.



Example: Windows XP

- Security is based on user accounts
 - Each user has unique security ID
 - Login to ID creates security access token
 - Includes security ID for user, for user's groups, and special privileges
 - Every process gets copy of token
 - System checks token to determine if access allowed or denied
- Uses a subject model to ensure access security. A subject tracks and manages permissions for each program that a user runs
- Each object in Windows XP has a security attribute defined by a security descriptor
 - For example, a file has a security descriptor that indicates the access permissions for all users

